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Feminist Literary Criticism and the Author 
Cheryl Walker 
In the late 1960s French theorists began to take account of the phenom-
enon we now know familiarly as "the death of the author." Writers like 
Michel Foucault raised startling questions about the voice or voices in a 
text, asking, "What difference does it make who is speaking?"' In the 
days of author criticism, the author was thought to be the speaker 
whose presence behind the text signaled his (or her, though usually his) 
capacity as originator. Textual interpretations often alluded to this 
historical personage as a genius whose subjectivity, once understood, 
provided a set of principles for discovering the underlying unity of a 
great work of literature. 
According to Foucault, in his essay "What Is an Author?" (1969), 
this authorial presence has disappeared. In the modern period the 
author is an effacement, an absence of the personal, who writes him- or 
herself out of the text through the strategies of fictive composition. 
Nonetheless, we still have what Foucault calls "the author function," 
which allows us to classify "a Woolf novel," for instance, as a different 
kind of entity than a novel by Jane Austen. The author-function is not a 
subjective presence but a signature, in which "the author's name serves 
to characterize a certain mode of being of discourse" ("WI A," p. 1 07). 
For advice on this essay, I wish to thank Frances McConnel, John Peavoy, Elizabeth 
Minnich, and Marilyn Edelstein. I also owe a debt of gratitude to Walter Benn Michaels, 
who started me down this path by forcing me to rethink my own naive assumptions about 
authors. 
I. Michel Foucault, "What Is an Author?" trans. Josue V. Harari, in The Foucault 
Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York, 1984), p. 120; hereafter abbreviated "WI A." 
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Though the death of the author may be variously traced to certain 
nineteenth-century writers like Stephane Mallarme and Friedrich 
Nietzsche, today some of us associate it more often with the theoretical 
moves of French critics like Foucault, Roland Barthes, or Jacques 
Derrida who have questioned the whole notion of the unified subject, 
the center, the self.2 Individuals cannot be authors, in part, because 
there is no such center or integrated core from which one can say a 
piece of literature issues. The binary oppositions between self and 
other, inside and outside, are two of the many dualities Derrida has 
powerfully deconstructed. The self is a structuring mechanism, not a 
godlike creator. Unlike the deity, we do not originate; we only translate 
among various given languages of feeling: "the writer can only imitate a 
gesture that is always anterior, never original. His only power is to mix 
writings, to counter the ones with the others, in such a way as never to 
rest on any one of them," Barthes says ("DA," p. 146). 
In 1969 Foucault is less extreme than Barthes or Derrida in the 
sense that he believes "it would be pure romanticism ... to imagine a 
culture in which the fictive would operate in an absolutely free state, in 
which fiction would be put at the disposal of everyone and would de-
velop without passing through something like a necessary or constrain-
ing figure" ("WIA," p. 119). Thus he does not at that time propose that 
texts be construed as fields of discourse without any boundaries 
(authorial or otherwise) to limit the free play of the signifier, as Barthes 
and Derrida do. Instead, he diverts our attention from the intentions of 
the text to "the modes of circulation, valorization, attribution, and 
appropriation of discourses" ("WIA," p. 117) or, in other words, to the 
reception of texts according to the modes of distribution established by 
power relations. However, he also considers significant "the subject's 
[the author's?] points of insertion, modes of functioning, and system of 
2. See Roland Barthes, "The Death of the Author," Image, Music, Text, trans. 
Stephen Heath (New York, 1977), pp. 142-48; hereafter abbreviated "DA." For Jacques 
Derrida's conception of the role of the subject, see his Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri 
Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore, 1976); "Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the 
Human Sciences,~ trans. Alan Bass, in Critical Theory Since 1965, ed. Hazard Adams and 
Leroy Searle (Tallahassee, Fla., 1986), pp. 83-94; and Limited Inc (Evanston, Ill., 1988). 
Cheryl Walker is professor of English and humanities at Scripps 
College. She is the author of The Nightingale's Burden: Women Poets and 
American Culture before 1900 (1982) and Masks Outrageous and Austere: 
Culture, Psyche, and Persona in Modern Women Poets (forthcoming). She is 
currently editing an anthology of nineteenth-century women poets and 
a book of essays about feminist criticism in the wake of post-structural-
Ism. 
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dependencies" within culture ("WIA," p. 118), a point to which I will 
return later. 
The issues that Foucault raises about reception and reading are 
certainly part of the contemporary discussion of literature. However, 
they are not the only issues with which we, as today's readers, are 
concerned. Discussions about the role of the author persist and so we 
continue to have recourse to the notion of authorship. 
For instance, in her recent book SexualJTextual Politics (1985), the 
feminist critic Toril Moi feels called on to return to these twenty-year-
old issues in French theory to tell us what it has meant to speak of the 
author, when she says: "For the patriarchal critic, the author is the 
source, origin and meaning of the text. If we are to undo this patriar-
chal practice of authority, we must take one further step and proclaim 
with Roland Barthes the death of the author. "3 
In the course of this essay I wish to reopen the (never fully closed) 
question of whether it is advisable to speak of the author, or of what 
Foucault calls "the author function," when querying a text, and I wish to 
reopen it precisely at the site where feminist criticism and post-structur-
alism are presently engaged in dialogue. Here in particular we might 
expect that reasons for rejecting author erasure would appear. 
However, theoretically informed feminist critics have recently found 
themselves tempted to agree with Barthes, Foucault, and the Edward 
Said of Beginnings that the authorial presence is best set aside in order to 
liberate the text for multiple uses.4 
I wish to examine the ways in which feminist critics have moved 
away from what some would call the old-fashioned assumption that 
what we do when we read is try to decipher the intentions of the text in 
terms of what we assume to be the author's deepest self. I also wish to 
make a further argument for reanimating the author, preserving 
author-function not only in terms of reception theory, as Foucault 
would seem at one point to advocate, but also in terms of a politics of 
author recognition. 
1 
A mild form of author questioning can be found in two recent 
anthologies of feminist theory. In their 1985 Making a Difference: Femi-
nist Literary Criticism, Gayle Greene and Coppetia Kahn advise feminist 
critics to pay attention to those theorists who "in liberating the text 
'from the authority of a presence behind it,' released it 'from the 
3. Toril Moi, SexualfTextual Politics: Feminist Literary Theory (London and New 
York, 1985), pp. 62-63; hereafter abbreviated STP. 
4. See Edward W. Said, Beginnings: Intention and Method (New York, 1975), p. 162. 
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constraints of a single and univocal reading,' making it 'available for 
production, plural, contradictory, capable of change ... unfixed, a 
process.' "5 
Though the postmodern feminist critic is almost certain to practice 
her trade in defiance of authority, often proceeding polyvocally herself 
and rarely claiming that a unified, coherent, and transcendental subjec-
tivity lies behind the text, nevertheless the author has never quite 
disappeared from our practice. The above quotation from Greene and 
Kahn, for instance, is less doctrinaire than Barthes, suggesting not that 
we refuse all attempts at deciphering a text's meaning but that a single 
referent be replaced by an interactive model of the text as inviting 
interpretation through a process of multiple readings and references. 
This quotation itself is drawn from a double authorship where we 
do not know which of the two voices (Greene's or Kahn's) is speaking in 
any given phrase. Furthermore, there is a third presence (or absence) in 
the interpolated quotations from Catherine Belsey, who is herself quot-
ing Derrida. Clearly, there are many voices speaking in this text. But 
the ascription to Belsey suggests as much as anything that we are unwill-
ing to do away with the author entirely, though it should be noted that 
when Foucault speaks of the author, he does not mean simply the 
proper name of the writer but a system of limiting meaning that allies 
the proper name with a whole series of assumptions about what belongs 
to it. (A "Woolf novel" is not simply one written by Virginia Woolf.) 
The author's name is not, for Foucault, just a proper name like the rest. 
Still, Greene and Kahn feel obliged to mention Belsey as the "author" 
of the quoted remarks. What are the implications of this gesture? 
Foucault suggests that such an act may be a consequence of bourgeois 
ideology because it signifies that the text "belongs" to an individual like 
a piece of private property. My own instincts tell me that Greene and 
Kahn's attribution may involve the notion that texts function like prop-
erty, but textual property, they imply, has special attributes: it is 
alienable and inalienable at the same time.6 
From one point of view, they are joining with Belsey, thus, in a 
sense, making a communal statement in which there is no need to 
divide up authorship like property. From another viewpoint, of course, 
5. Gayle Greene and Coppelia Kahn, "Feminist Scholarship and the Social 
Construction of Woman," in Making a Difference: Feminist Literary Criticism, ed. Greene and 
Kahn (London and New York, 1985), p. 25; also see pp. 27-28. The interpolated state-
ments are from Catherine Betsey, Critical Practice (London and New York, 1980), pp. 136, 
134. 
6. Nancy K. Miller disagrees with Foucault about the possibility of finding a 
language site outside bourgeois ideology. Since she appears to agree with Barthes that no 
such site exists, she finds appealing certain metaphors of stealing and disguise in order to 
suggest the need for reforming the dominant text. See Miller, "Changing the Subject: 
Authorship, Writing, and the Reader," in Feminist Studies f Critical Studies, ed. Teresa de 
Lauretis (Bloomington, Ind., I986), pp. I 02-20, esp. p. Ill; hereafter abbreviated "CS." 
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proper ascription is necessary in order not to be caught in an act of 
misappropriation, an act of stealing. However, this politics need not be 
simply one of guilt (stealing is sinful) nor one of fear (stealing is punish-
able); it can also be one of respect (we wish you to have the credit for 
configuring this semantic sequence that we are appropriating for our 
own purposes). In all three cases, the author remains in some form. 
This is not, however, the same thing as suggesting, as Steven 
Knapp and Walter Benn Michaels have done in their essays "Against 
Theory" and "Against Theory 2," that the meaning of a text is always 
and only what its author intends. 7 It is, to the contrary, a position neither 
consonant with Barthes's belief that the most revolutionary form of 
criticism requires refusing to discover the author in a space of writing 
nor synonymous with the proposition (a Ia Knapp and Michaels) that the 
author provides the only locus in which meaning can properly be 
ascribed. What we are often seeking as feminists, it seems, is a third 
position. 
So far the discussions within feminist criticism concerning the 
implications of post-structural theory for the positioning of the author 
have generally proceeded from theory to practice. (There continues to 
be much practice, of course, in which the theoretical issues are not even 
raised.) The theorists, however, reasonably wonder: should we valorize 
the author if such a position necessarily implies the same kind of repres-
sion we associate with patriarchy? 
It is well to remember Foucault's caution here that the author-
function implies a convergence of many indicators given status within a 
particular context. "As a result, we could say that in a civilization like 
our own there are a certain number of discourses that are endowed 
with the 'author function,' while others are deprived of it" ("WIA," p. 
107). Though Foucault's examples of deprivation concern private 
letters and contracts that, he says, do not have authors in this sense, we 
might also remember the way the canon guarantees authorship to 
certain privileged writers while others are degraded to the level of 
mere literary names, which only a Trivial Pursuit-minded individual 
would think it necessary to "know" in the kind of detail that, we are 
told, a literate person should know, say, Dostoyevski.8 
7. See Steven Knapp and Walter Benn Michaels, "Against Theory," in Against 
Theory: Literary Studies and the New Pragmatism, ed. W. J. T. Mitchell (Chicago, 1985), pp. 
11-30, and Knapp and Michaels," Against Theory 2: Hermeneutics and Deconstruction," 
Critical Inquiry 14 (Autumn 1987): 49-68. Knapp and Michaels make a radical argument 
that a text has only one meaning, the meaning its author intends, and that that meaning 
never changes. The only point of literary criticism is to figure out what the author 
intended. 
8. Moi's argument is different. Since she believes that author-critics have engaged 
in an imperialist attempt to repress, undermine, overwhelm, or otherwise colonize the 
freedom of interpretation, we must get rid of all versions of the author, male or female. 
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My second example of recent author discussion concerns Nancy K. 
Miller's "Changing the Subject: Authorship, Writing, and the Reader." 
Miller returns to the question of authorship, hoping to keep several 
balls in the air at the same time: post-structuralism's assault on the 
author and feminism's productive attention to the writing subjectivities 
of women.9 Miller finds useful for feminism some aspects of the ideol-
ogy of"the death of the author." She reminds us that "it is, after all, the 
Author, canonized, anthologized, and institutionalized, who excludes 
the less-known works of women and minority writers from the canon, 
and who by his authority justifies the exclusion" ("CS," p. 104). Yet 
Miller is suspicious of applying the same version of author erasure to 
women writers since our relation to subjectivity formation has been 
different. 
The postmodernist decision that the Author is dead, and subjective 
agency along with him, does not necessarily work for women and 
prematurely forecloses the question of identity for them. Because 
women have not had the same historical relation of identity to 
origin, institution, production, that men have had, women have 
not, I think, (collectively) felt burdened by too much Self, Ego, 
Cogito, etc. ["CS," p. 106] 
Miller leaves open the possibility of retaining a reconceived author-
function in the case of women writers. However, she does indeed 
"change the subject" as her title implies by concentrating primarily on 
women as readers (a position she like Barthes believes to be "the neces-
sary counterpoint to the death of the Author" ["CS," p. 104 ]). Further-
more, she backs away from post-structuralism as an ontology (perhaps a 
deontology) that denies meaning to coherent subjectivity and to the 
author (any author, male or female) as the originator of discourse. Her 
argument seems to imply that the notion of the death of the author 
arises because men feel overburdened by ego, self, and so on rather 
than, as Foucault would have it, that the author is a function created 
entirely by the writing itself and unlocatable outside of it. Foucault says, 
"In short, it is a matter of depriving the subject (or its substitute) of its 
role as originator, and of analyzing the subject as a variable and 
complex function of discourse" ("WIA," p. 118). 
If authors only emerge from the written texts, then the question of 
how these texts were written in the first place attempts to go "behind" 
9. De Lauretis makes an interesting assessment of Miller in her introduction to 
Feminist Studies I Critical Studies where she says that Miller is a keen observer of the 
"double temporality of intellectual history, which unfolds concurrently-and discontin-
uously-in 'women's time' of feminist criticism and in 'the Eastern Standard time' of 
traditional scholarship" (de Lauretis, "Feminist Studies/Critical Studies: Issues, Terms, 
and Contexts," in Feminist Studies I Critical Studies, p. 16). 
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the writing in a way rendered illegitimate by critics like Barthes, whom 
Miller seems to wish not to attack. Identity formation may have differ-
ent structural patterns for women, but these are irrelevant to the 
question of whether women can, under such post-structural theories of 
textuality, operate as the authors of their own works. Miller says that 
we must pay attention to the "asymmetrical demands generated by different 
writing identities, male and female, or, perhaps more usefully, canonical or 
hegemonic and noncanonical or marginal" ("CS," p. 1 05). But this is surely 
a different perspective than that of Foucault and Barthes, as it implies 
that women (or noncanonical and marginal writers) can be authors 
whereas men (or canonical and hegemonic writers) cannot. The ques-
tion remains, how can an absence generate a demand? 
Moi's is probably the most radical feminist borrowing of French 
male theory in its insistence on a feminist proclamation of the death of 
the author. Moi's Sexual f Textual Politics has had very wide circulation, 
and so it seems worthwhile to look more closely now at what she does 
with this notion in her own work. To begin with, she discounts the 
tendency in Anglo-American feminist criticism to supply biographical 
material about an author (in her case, Woolf) when writing about liter-
ary texts. Dismissing as "emotionalist" and irrelevant Jane Marcus's 
notation that Woolf trembled as she wrote, Moi asks: "does it really 
matter whether or not Woolf was in the habit of trembling at her 
desk?" (STP, p. 1 7). 
Presumably it doesn't matter, if the author is "dead" as a reference 
point for the meaning of the text. Yet in terms of some of Moi's other 
critical assumptions, her position on this issue seems contradictory. 
When Foucault asked "What difference does it make who is speaking?" 
he may have been suggesting that we reveal our own epistemological 
assumptions and our own politics of interpretation by our insistence on 
a certain notion of subjectivity as speaking. It can never be shown that 
the treatment of the author as speaking makes no difference, since 
every way of constructing the text makes some difference. The point is 
to consider what difference such a difference makes. 
Similarly, nothing can be proven irrelevant to a text unless some 
principles controlling relevance (that is, restricting potential hermeneu-
tic strategies) are posited, a position problematic for those who, like 
Moi, are committed to radical open-endedness. If the text cannot be 
closed to effects previously considered extrinsic to it, effects like its 
reception, the history of its conventions, the sociopolitical context of its 
composition, and so on, it also cannot be closed to the biographical 
contexts of its writing. 
The second way in which Moi's argument seems to me problematic 
is in its radical distinction between fictional writing and critical writing. 
Moi's own textual politics involves an extended dialogue with authors 
who are critics. These critics operate in terms of the "author function" 
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Foucault describes so well. That is, Moi ascribes to these critic/authors 
certain unified positions that categorize them as speakers. Their works 
are not read by Moi as indeterminate, contradictory, elusive; she 
assumes that we can sum them up, know what they are saying, and place 
them in terms of the way their arguments are made. Information about 
their sociohistorical relations is important to her classifications. An 
Anglo-American heritage is different from a French one. 
In short, Moi preserves the notion of authorship when reading crit-
ics while advising we dispense with it when reading literature, 
presumably following Foucault's notion that the author-function does 
not affect all discourses in a uniform and constant way. Though 
recently we have come to know a good deal more about the biographi-
cal circumstances of critics like Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar than 
used to be typical outside the rumor mill of academy insiders, Moi 
implies we read criticism differently. We don't try to locate autobiogra-
phical traces in the work of discursive writers; we simply use the proper 
names as a shorthand for identifying the theory. We do not concern 
ourselves with the sociological conditions of composition. 
Or do we? Certainly the recent brouhaha over the publications of 
Paul de Man in the Nazi-oriented journal Le Soir during the early I 940s 
has spawned a rereading of his critical works by both detractors and 
sympathizers. In fact, in what seems to be a radical reversal of earlier 
positions, Derrida has recently recommended such a rereading in order 
to understand the historical personage Paul de Man. 10 In Moi's own 
case, her close association with British Marxist critic Terry Eagleton 
during the historical moment of Sexual/ Textual Politics has led some 
readers to say privately that the book was either overdetermined by 
Eagleton's own thinking or, conversely, an extended argument with 
Eagleton's brand of feminism. My point here is certainly not to make an 
argument against Moi ad feminam but to question her separation 
between fictional and critical texts. 
It seems to me that the assumptions operating here are deeply 
problematic even within the context of post-structuralism. It is possible 
to deconstruct Moi's argument by remembering with it the contempo-
rary presentation of all culture as discourse and Derrida's proposition, 
in particular, that there is nothing outside the text. The false dichot-
omy Moi offers is that of assuming onl)' an old-fashioned, author-
centered critical practice based on a unified, coherent, bourgeois 
notion of self or a contradictory, open-ended, free plane of discourse on 
which critics range over a space of writing" 'ceaselessly posit[ing] mean-
10. See Derrida, "Like the Sound of the Sea Deep within a Shell: Paul de Man's 
War," trans. Peggy Kamuf, Critical Inqui')· 14 (Spring 1988): 590-652. The Summer 
1989 issue of Critical Inquiry contains responses to this essay. 
Copyright (c) 2003 ProQuest Information and Learning Company 
Copyright (c) University of Chicago Press 
Critical Inquiry Spring 1990 559 
ing ceaselessly to evaporate it,'" as she suggests, using Barthes's words 
(STP, p. 63). 11 Like the distinctions between critical and creative writ-
ing, and those between historical circumstances and literary texts, this 
dichotomy somehow forgets other propositions that belong to the very 
forms of critical practice-feminism, post-structuralism-Moi herself 
claims to be interested in bringing to bear. 
As I have tried to suggest above, it is not true that we read criticism 
and fiction in diametrically opposed ways, limiting the importance of 
the author's subjectivity in one while exalting it in the other. Further-
more, the reversal of these positions (erasing the author of fictive work 
while preserving the author of criticism) also seems misguided. 
In terms of post-structuralism, it is worth paying attention to the 
attack made by Hayden White and others on the old division between 
creative and critical discourse. 12 White and Dominick LaCapra have 
both argued that this division will not bear scrutiny. They have been at 
pains to show that analytical history uses the same rhetorical tech-
niques, the same tropes, the same narrative strategies as literature. 
Narrative history, narrative criticism, and narrative literature all use 
the formulae of narrativity. 
Presumably Moi would argue that she is not writing narrative criti-
cism. Yet all of the critical texts Moi engages tell a story. In fact, it is 
precisely because Moi doesn't like the story that Gilbert and Gubar tell 
that she reminds us that telling a story "can in itself be constructed as an 
autocratic gesture" (STP, p. 68). Does Moi believe she herself is doing 
anything else? Is her text not an elegant story about the way female crit-
ics, connected to one another like characters in a Woolf novel, engage 
in gestures of mutual recognition and respect while at the same time 
seeking to escape the party to find room for solitary reflection and 
independence? Doesn't her book have a clearly identifiable beginning, 
middle, and end at which the defiant figure of Julia Kristeva emerges 
somewhat battered but victorious nonetheless, repeating a pattern with 
roots as ancient as storytelling itself? 
Second, the distinction between history and literature (reanimated 
where Moi dismisses biographical circumstances in favor of the texts 
themselves) somehow assumes that the process of juxtaposing historical 
information with literary artifacts is something other than what some 
post-structuralists assume it is, an experience of intertextuality to be 
valued no more and no less than any other intertextual exercise for the 
illumination, the sparks of recognition, it produces. In his chapter 
"History and the Novel" in History and Criticism (1985), LaCapra advises 
11. See"DA,"p.l47. 
12. See Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century 
Europe (Baltimore, 1973). See also Dominick LaCapra, History and Criticism (Ithaca, N.Y., 
1985), and his more recent History, Politics, and the Novel (Ithaca, N.Y., 1987). 
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historians and literary critics to engage the past through such a process 
of intertextual dialogue: 
A move in a desirable direction is, I think, made when texts are 
understood as variable uses of language that come to terms with-
or "inscribe"-contexts in various ways-ways that engage the 
interpreter as historian and critic in an exchange with the past 
through a reading of texts. 
Contexts of interpretation are at least three-fold; those of writ-
ing, reception, and critical reading. 
Contexts of writing include the intentions of the author as well 
as more immediate biographical, sociocultural, and political situa-
tions with their ideologies and discourses. They also involve 
discursive institutions such as traditions and genres. 13 
Like LaCapra's advice to the critic, Derrida's famous statement 
that there is nothing outside the text implies that we are free to develop 
intertextual dialogues by juxtaposing biography with literature, history 
with criticism, medical handbooks with political treatises, and so forth. 
The life of the author is not a privileged content, since it, too, is a set of 
texts (Gilbert has called it "the life-text"), but the question remains as to 
why such texts should be denied or repressed, as they appear in Moi's 
argument. 
Most disturbing for me, however, are what I feel to be the antifem-
inist implications of Moi's insistence that we joyfully proclaim the death 
of the author. Miller usefully reminds us that "the removal of the 
Author has not so much made room for a revision of the concept of 
authorship as it has, through a variety of rhetorical moves, repressed 
and inhibited discussion of any writing identity in favor of the (new) 
monolith of anonymous textuality" ("CS," p. I 04). What Miller points 
to here are the limitations of some applications of post-structuralism in 
meeting the needs of current feminism. In fact, what we need, instead 
of a theory of the death of the author, is a new concept of authorship 
that does not naively assert that the writer is an originating genius, 
creating aesthetic objects outside of history, but does not diminish the 
importance of difference and agency in the responses of women writers 
to historical formations. The loss of the writer runs us the risk of losing 
many stories important to our history. Radical freedom, of the sort Moi 
seems to advocate, may in the end leave us without the tools necessary 
to consider the way biography and fiction a rr in dialogue with one 
another and provide a critique of patriarchy as well as, in some cases, 
models of resistance. Barthes's form of textual response (though not 
Foucault's) would leave us with no literary history whatsoever. 
13. LaCapra, "History and the Novel," History and Criticism, p. 127. 
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2 
Here it may be useful to examine briefly the way contemporary 
feminist critics, more or less theoretical, are using the author-function 
in literary criticism of the late 1980s. I will take my examples from the 
field I know best, criticism concerned with women poets. Though my 
examples are in no way meant to represent all contemporary positions 
on authorship among feminist critics, they are instructive both in the 
way one (Paula Bennett) suggests the problems of ignoring the attack 
on the author and in the way the others (Alicia Ostriker, Jan Monte-
fiore, and Cora Kaplan) adhere to a revised concept of authorship. 
Bennett's My Life A Loaded Gun: Female Creativity and Feminist Poet-
ics, Kaplan's Sea Changes: Essays on Culture and Feminism, and Ostriker's 
Stealing the Language: The Emergence ofWomen's Poetry in America were all 
published in 1986. Montefiore's Feminism and Poetry: Language, Experi-
ence, Identity in Women's Writing appeared in 1987. 14 Two of these critics 
are American (Bennett and Ostriker); the other two write in England 
(though Kaplan is American by birth). It seems to me roughly true that 
it is still possible to be an American feminist literary critic without 
taking into consideration recent French theory; it is less possible to be a 
British one. 
This might in part explain the almost total exclusion of French 
theory from Bennett's book. (There is one footnote listing several 
sources on French feminism.) My Life A Loaded Gun explores the lives 
and work of three women poets-Emily Dickinson, Sylvia Plath, and 
Adrienne Rich-and takes the point of view, now familiar from Gilbert 
and Gubar, that the critical content of women's art is female rage. 
Bennett assumes no disjunction between poet and speaker and repeat-
edly reads the poems as though they provide information about the 
author. Furthermore, the essence of successful authority seems to be 
integrity, that unified self so inconceivable to postmodernism. Dickin-
son, Plath, and Rich all wore "self-alienating masks" during some 
portion of their lives, claims Bennett, "but all finally learned how to 
discard the mask and speak directly from the unacceptable core of their 
beings, to claim their loaded guns." 15 
14. See Paula Bennett, My Life A Loaded Gun: Female Creativity and Feminist Poetics 
(Boston, 1986); Cora Kaplan, Sea Changes: Essays on Culture and Feminism (London, 1986), 
hereafter abbreviated SC; Alicia Suskin Ostriker, Stealing the Language: The Emergence of 
Women's Poetry in America (Boston, 1986), hereafter abbreviated SL; and Jan Montefiore, 
Feminism and Poetry: Language, Experience, Identity in Women's Writing (London and New 
York, 1987), hereafter abbreviated FP. For another comparison of Bennett and Ostriker, 
see my review of these two books in Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 14 
(Autumn 1988): 220-22. 
15. Bennett, My Life A Loaded Gun, p. 1 1. 
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Bennett is not a stupid critic, and I did find many of her insights 
fascinating. Furthermore, she does not always ascribe conscious inten-
tions to her poets (she does not make Dickinson a feminist, for 
instance). She is alert to their inconsistencies and sensitive about the 
influence of cultural context. However, she does fall into many of the 
traps exposed by French theory. The author is the meaning of the text, 
a personal, autobiographical personage who has a "true self" that can 
be embodied relatively transparently in language. The true self has a 
singular project: the expression of that "constant, never-changing femi-
nist rage," which Moi says "manages to transform all texts written by 
women into feminist texts" in American criticism influenced by the 
Gilbert and Gubar of The Madwoman in the Attic (STP, p. 62). 
Ostriker provides another brand of American criticism in Stealing 
the Language. She is much more savvy about theory than Bennett, a fact 
made abundantly clear from the beginning of her book where she 
discusses her own eclectic methodology. Furthermore, Ostriker avoids 
many of the traps that Bennett falls into by arranging her poems 
thematically (after the first chapter) rather than reading them in terms 
of their relation to single authors. 
Still, Ostriker wishes to preserve the author as speaker in the text. 
A warning is therefore appropriate here for readers who were 
trained, as I was, not to mistake the "I" in a poem for a real person. 
The training has its uses, but also its limitations. For most of the 
poems in this book, academic distinctions between the self and 
what we in the classroom call the "persona" move to vanishing 
point. When a woman poet today says "1," she is likely to mean 
herself, as intensely as her verbal skills permit, much as Words-
worth or Keats did, or Blake, or Milton, or John Donne of the Holy 
Sonnets, before Eliot's "extinction of personality" became the 
mandatory twentieth-century initiation ritual for young American 
poets, and before the death of the author became a popular critical 
fiction. [SL, p. 12] 
Ostriker takes the intentions of her poets seriously; the poem may not, 
and often does not for Ostriker, add up to only what the poet intended. 
Yet the author is also on stage in the poem. This does not, however, 
mean-as it does for Bennett's most approved models-that in the best 
poems women have discarded their masks. Neither does it mean that 
the best women poets-in a Barthesian mode of playfulness-exploit 
the freedom of knowing the inevitability of masking. Ostriker says, 
"When masks and disguises govern the poems, ... it is not to entertain 
us but because the mask has grown into the flesh." Furthermore, for 
Ostriker there is no true self or core of identity to which we can refer 
the final meaning of a poem. "The split selves in women's poems are 
both true, both false" (SL, pp. 12, 84). 
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However, rather than locating multiplicity as inevitable in all 
subjective and literary spaces, she implies that this is a special disadvan-
tage of the feminine: "the division reflects and is reinforced by our 
culture's limited images of feminine personality" (SL, p. 84). For my 
part, I think it important to accept the notion of all authorial subjectivi-
ties as plural while at the same time disentangling the modes of 
subjectivity available to different groups at different times. For me, the 
personae that function in the first-person pronouns of John Milton and 
John Donne must differ from those of William Blake and John Keats, 
because subjectivity in the seventeenth century meant something 
different from what it meant in the nineteenth century or means in our 
own day. Furthermore, I think we still need to explore an individual 
poem's connections to its cultural setting, its invocation of conventions, 
and projection of an illusion of self. Though I admire Ostriker's work a 
great deal, I am perhaps more of a Foucauldian than she. 
In what amounts to an attack on male author-centered critics of the 
mid-twentieth century, Montefiore assigns to romanticism the notion 
that the author/poet is "a transcendent subject representing the 'human 
spirit,"' but she finds such romanticism also broadly represented in 
American women poets like Edna St. Vincent Millay and Adrienne 
Rich. Millay's conception of the poetic is "that poetry is the articulation 
of a straightforward subjectivity ('the expression of profoundly felt 
personal experience')" (FP, p. 124). Criticizing Millay as romantic also 
means that Montefiore parts company with those feminist critics who 
have attempted to trace the role of literary expressions in bringing to 
consciousness conflicts buried in the poet's psyche, critics like Bennett, 
Ostriker, Gilbert and Gubar, and myself. "To begin with a literary-crit-
ical point, the assumption that the significance of a poem is to be 
identified with the experience and consciousness of the poet is always 
debatable, because it is the poems which are available to us, not the 
poet's mind" (FP, p. 5). She refers us to that old chestnut, "The Inten-
tional Fallacy" by W. K. Wimsatt and Monroe C. Beardsley, and also to 
Barthes's essay, "The Death of the Author." 16 
Feminism and Poetry is, in fact, an extended argument against 
author-centered criticism involving a number of points. First, Monte-
fiore says that such criticism often ignores the specific linguistic 
characteristics of poems. "No other kind of writing holds its own words 
up to the light as poetry does." Second, she finds such criticism narrow: 
"criticism based on the assumption that what makes a poem valuable 
and interesting is its author's awareness, enacted within it, of her own 
dilemma as a woman (which in practice generally means her sexual/ 
domestic life) risks reducing everything to the personal" (FP, pp. 6, 5). 
16. See W. K. Wimsatt, "The Intentional Fallacy," The Verbal Icon: Studies in the 
Meaning of Poetry (Lexington, Ky., 1954), pp. 3-18. 
Copyright (c) 2003 ProQuest Information and Learning Company 
Copyright (c) University of Chicago Press 
564 Cheryl Walker Feminist Literary Criticism and the Author 
Finally, Montefiore believes that such criticism ignores many problem-
atic aspects of poems, their ambiguity, contradictoriness, open-
endedness, complicity with patriarchy, though why persons should be 
less ambiguous, contradictory, or open-ended than poems remains 
obscure. 
But in paying little attention to biographical or historical contexts, 
since they "would explain some of the causes of the poems, not their 
textual effects" (FP, p. 134), Montefiore falls into another trap: that of 
assuming that the poems are "available to us" (that is, are texts) while 
the cultures and poets themselves remain unavailable (that is, are some-
thing other than texts). A critic whose practice is committed to many 
sets of textual juxtapositions (biographical, cultural, historical) may find 
Montefiore's work limited in scope and naive about its own formalistic 
assumptions. 
Still, Montefiore, like Margaret Homans whom she admires, is 
adept at investigating ideological contradictions and linguistic ambigui-
ties.17 Her stance gives her a certain lattitude within feminism not 
shared by others. She can admire a poem (like Sylvia Townsend 
Warner's "Drawing you, heavy with sleep to draw closer") that does not 
transcend the assumptions of patriarchy. She can appreciate Dickin-
son's range of poems, calling them "too ambiguous and contradictory 
to be read as purely woman-centered texts" (FP, p. 175). Even more 
interesting, she can relentlessly attack Rich's statements and intentions 
while clearly (because consistently) preferring her above all contempo-
rary others. In a reading of "Twenty-One Love Poems," Montefiore 
writes, "Like many of Rich's best poems, this purports to re-create 
experience straightforwardly, but actually creates a fable" (FP, p. 163 ). 
So much for the author's intentions and for the poet's experience as the 
locus of the poem. 
On its own ground, Montefiore's criticism is very shrewd. Where 
she uses French theory, as she frequently does, to critique essentialist 
assumptions and the notion of a female space outside history, I find her 
work quite convincing. However, there are many aspects of the relation 
between author and text that her critical practice will not illuminate, 
like the multiple contexts of reading and writing that LaCapra does 
such a good job of enumerating. 
Kaplan, a feminist Marxist critic, comes much closer to my own 
brand of cultural criticism in her insistence on reading women's work as 
statements about actual women's experiences in history while not slid-
17. See Margaret Homans, Women Writers and Poetic Identity: Dorothy Wordsworth, 
Emily Bronte; and Emily Dickinson (Princeton, N.J., 1980), esp. pp. 216-18. Both Homans 
and Montefiore find the whole question of how women's experience becomes embodied 
in fictive language so perplexing that they prefer not to discuss any autobiographical 
traces in women's poems. 
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ing over the contradictoriness and opacity of such works as information 
about the writer's psyche. Kaplan says: 
Women's fiction and poetry is a site where women [have] actively 
structured the meaning of sexual difference in their society, espe-
cially and powerfully as it [has] applied to difference between 
women .... these writings properly considered undermine the 
programmatic way in which bourgeois ideology is used as a short-
hand by male marxist critics for a unified, genderless, hegemonic 
system of ideas. [SC, p. 3] 
Kaplan constantly interrogates her own political ideologies-
Marxist and feminist-illustrating the gaps and contradictions in the 
ways these ideologies are currently structured. She finds that literature 
has a lot to say to politics, about the need to reconceptualize Marxism, 
for instance. Her authors are present and active, intervening in culture 
though often drawn back into collusion with oppressive cultural prac-
tices.18 
For Kaplan, the engagement of feminism with theory has had 
considerable effect on critical practice and has been one of the princi-
pal factors preventing French structuralist, psychoanalytic, linguistic, 
and political analysis from being entirely transformed and depoliticized 
outside of France. However, the usefulness of theory does not mean 
advocating the death of the author. 
Kaplan does not specifically address the idea of the death of the 
author. Nevertheless, implicit in her analyses is a revised conception of 
author-function. She applauds Ellen Moers as a critic because "she does 
not attempt to prove anything about Christina Rossetti's individual 
experience" (SC, p. 104). Writers have intentions ("these complex lyrics 
of Rossetti and Dickinson were designed to circumvent the resistance of 
writer and reader" [SC, p. 114]), but poems are not reducible to inten-
tionality. Indeed, as Anne Sexton (and Elinor Wylie) proclaimed, the 
writer may not want to know exactly what she is saying in a poem. 19 
Addressing Elizabeth Barrett Browning's Aurora Leigh, Kaplan is 
perfectly ready to say that the poem memorializes Browning's own 
18. The most delightful aspects of Sea Changes for an American reader like me are 
the way the book embodies energies usefully deployed, the respect it pays to the success-
ful agency of women writers, and the constant sense of Kaplan herself as peripatetic 
writer, teacher, cultural critic, and political activist. Such work can make one believe that 
literary criticism and the writing of poetry can be political practices in England, which one 
is rarely able to believe in the United States. 
19. Kaplan quotes Anne Sexton as saying that her poems sometimes had a meaning 
so deep that she didn't want to know what it was (SC, p. 114). Similarly, Elinor Wylie saw 
in fictive language a way to avoid "'the bitterness of being understood,'" but also "the 
bitterness of understanding" (Wylie, "Symbols in Literature," Collected Prose of Elinor Wylie 
[New York, 1933], pp. 878, 879). 
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troubled history, but the point of Kaplan's argument is not to heroinize 
Browning as much as it is to revise a whole strand of feminist criticism. 
Kaplan argues that the text suggests that "daughters cannot be 
constructed wholly as social and psychic victims of their fathers or their 
fathers as wholly unregenerate villains." Furthermore, "the family 
romance woven through Aurora Leigh is only one strand of this rich 
poem" (SC, pp. 211, 210). 
The essential components of Kaplan's view of authorship are the 
following: (1) Literary texts have (rather than are) authors. (2) Authors 
are never full subjective presences because of the fluid nature of subjec-
tivity. (3) Both psychoanalysis and sociopolitical criticism that engages 
the author's experience in culture can be useful in interpreting texts, 
though texts are not reducible to such interpretations. (4) One impor-
tant function of criticism is to see how ideology emerges in the context 
of a specific historical text or subjectivity, which is simultaneously social 
and psychic. (5) None of Barthes's so-called hypostases (author, society, 
history, psyche) are unified or totalizing in their effects, and we can 
understand more clearly the complexity of culture and psyche by read-
ing literature. A fine summary of Kaplan's position may be found in her 
presentation of one of the values of fiction. 
3 
Literary texts give these simultaneous inscriptions narrative 
form, pointing towards and opening up the fragmentary nature of 
social and psychic identity, drawing out the ways in which social 
meaning is psychically represented .... Literary texts tell us more 
about the intersection of class and gender than we can learn from 
duly noting the material circumstances and social constraints of 
characters and authors. [SC, p. 167] 
At this point it may seem unnecessary, given my evident admira-
tion for Kaplan's approach to authorship, to proceed any further. 
However, I have two reasons for wanting to do so. First, since Kaplan 
does not directly engage ."the death of the author," it seems to me 
worthwhile to formulate the dialogue between postmodernism and 
feminism emergent from her work. Second, I wish to expand Kaplan's 
implicit argument for retaining the author-function by adding my own 
theoretical response to Foucault's question: "What difference does it 
make who is speaking?" 
To return to my introductory summary of post-structuralism's 
position on the death of the author given in Barthes and Foucault, we 
might usefully ask: what precisely was killed off in the late 1960s when 
the death of the author was first articulated by French theorists? For 
Barthes, it was any attempt "to impose a limit on that text, to furnish it 
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with a final signified, to close the writing." Pondering a sentence in 
Balzac, Barthes insists: "No one, no 'person', says it: its source, its voice, 
is not the true place of the writing, which is reading." But in theory the 
reader is without attributes: "yet this destination cannot any longer be 
personal: the reader is without history, biography, psychology; he is 
simply that someone who holds together in a single field all the traces by 
which the given text is constituted" ("DA," pp. 147,148). 
For Barthes, then, what is killed off with the author is any specific 
historical subjectivity as a determining factor in textuality. Let us not fall 
into the trap of misunderstanding his purpose, however. Barthes does 
not deny that there are authors (he calls them scriptors); he does not 
insist that real readers have no personalities or historical circumstances. 
Such assertions would obviously be absurd. What he is claiming is that a 
proper theory of the text does not make its meaning depend on authors 
as unified subjectivities or on readers given individual characteristics. 
Readers make unities out of texts but a text itself is "made up of multi-
ple writings, drawn from many cultures and entering into mutual 
relations of dialogue, parody, contestation" ("DA," p. 148). In terms of 
a theory of the text, its unity emerges in readings and can always be 
reinterpreted. 
This is, in fact, far less radical or objectionable than it has been 
interpreted to be. It simply has the limitations of many theoretical 
statements. It doesn't address a whole range of issues one may well feel 
are worth addressing. What it does address is a certain authoritarian 
critical climate in which "the real meaning" of a text was deciphered 
either in terms of a unified conception of the author's subjectivity or in 
terms of a specific kind of reader. 
Barthes's essay is short and pithy. Foucault clearly felt it worth-
while the following year to expand on it. To my mind, Foucault's essay 
is both more and less satisfying than Barthes's. Foucault agrees with 
Barthes on all the basic issues except that Barthes implies that there is 
no point in talking about authors at all while Foucault preserves the 
author-function as characteristic of a historical present in criticism 
though a critical function in need of interrogation. Though in Foucault, 
"one has already called back into question the absolute character and 
founding role of the subject" as author, he goes on to say: "Still, 
perhaps one must return to this question, not in order to reestablish the 
theme of an originating subject, but to grasp the subject's points of 
insertion, modes of functioning, and system of dependencies" ("WIA," 
p. 118). This will lead to a new set of questions, questions that involve, 
as we might expect in Foucault, politics and power relations. "What are 
the modes of existence of this discourse? Where has it been used, how 
can it circulate, and who can appropriate it for himself? What are the 
places in it where there is room for possible subjects? Who can assume 
these various subject functions?" ("WIA," p. 120). 
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These are important questions, I would argue, and ones that do 
not emerge from Barthes's discussion. However, Barthes does not 
provide hermeneutic guidelines but merely offers a theory about the 
way writing functions as text. Even Barthes says we can follow up leads 
in disentangling a text-"the structure can be followed, 'run' (like the 
thread of a stocking) at every point and at every level, but there is noth-
ing beneath" ("DA," p. 147). Foucault actually says that textuality is 
political but then seems, in his last words, to deny the significance of 
politics: "And behind all these questions, we would hear hardly 
anything but the stirring of an indifference: What difference does it 
make who is speaking?" ("WIA," p. 120). 
Kaplan, in her implicit dialogue with Barthes and Foucault, seems 
to agree with some points and disagree with others. Authors do not 
originate texts in the sense that God originates ex nihilo. Still, authors 
are possible subjectivities whom we may consider as contradictory, fluc-
tuating presences in the text, which she calls significantly a "site." 
Kaplan is open about her political project as a Marxist critic. She there-
fore tells us that she is reading not for ultimate meaning but for 
positional meanings. Feminism and Marxism are alike in fostering such 
readings. 
Kaplan retains all of Foucault's questions about the relevance of 
author-function to understanding culture. Yet it remains possible in 
Kaplan's practice to talk about authors as historical agents of cultural 
criticism and change. The author does exist outside of the writing, has 
a life (as Browning has a family). It seems to me important to say, as 
many seem unwilling to do, that this cannot be reconciled with a certain 
brand of deconstructive criticism that would leave no significant place 
for authors as functional particularities. 20 
This leads me to my own position on author-function, which I feel 
supplements Kaplan's in important ways. My problems with Barthes 
and Foucault certainly do not have to do with the notion that we cannot 
fix an ultimate meaning through interpretation. Few would dispute 
that. However, a small point turns into a big point concerning the 
masculine pronoun used everywhere as representative in their work. 
Authors and readers are both masculine for Barthes and Foucault. 
To Barthes I would want to say, writing is not "the destruction of 
every voice" but the proliferation of possibilities of hearing. I intend this 
statement as a feminist reversal of Barthes, as Nelle Morton writes that 
feminist practice involves "hearing one another to speech."21 To say 
this, it seems to me, is a way of calling into question the impersonality of 
20. Miller also makes some of these points but seems straining to prevent an open 
break with French theory. I have tried to be clearer about where I agree and disagree. 
21. Nelle Morton, "A Word We Cannot Yet Speak," The journey Is Hom£' (Boston, 
1985), p. 99. See "DA," p. 142. 
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Barthes at both the level of his abstract formulations and the level of his 
linguistic practice, his generic masculine pronouns that obscure the 
differences among writers and readers. 
In Foucault I puzzle over the following statement: "Using all the 
contrivances that he sets up between himself and what he writes, the 
writing subject cancels out the signs of his particular individuality. As a 
result, the mark of the writer is reduced to nothing more than the 
singularity of his absence; he must assume the role of the dead man in 
the game of writing" ("WIA," pp. 1 02-3). Does this work equally well 
with all writers? Here it seems to me the difference between writing 
subjectivities is crucial. For H.D., for instance, writing does not place 
her in the position of the dead man for "she herself is the writing," as 
she said in one work, and the choice for her is to "write, write or die," 22 
not to write and die, as Foucault says is now customary. 
Postmodernism has certainly made us aware that we cannot locate 
full presence anywhere, whether in the psyche, in history, in culture, or 
in the text. However, presence must be distinguished from what has 
replaced it. Though there is no presence behind a text, there is an infi-
nite number of presences, or traces, in a given text. One of these 
presences is the author, about whom we cannot know everything 
(whose mind is not fully available to us, as Montefiore says). But the text 
is not present to us outside of interpretation either. There are always 
questions remaining about any complex text and many "texts" to 
consider. The success of our intertextual tracings of author in relation 
to literature will be determined by our readers. Some readers are not 
interested in the sociological contexts of text construction, but many 
are, as a recent issue of Critical Inquiry devoted to the sociology of litera-
ture attests. 
In this issue, Robert Weimann makes a valuable (though somewhat 
impacted) statement at the beginning of his article, "Text, Author-
Function, and Appropriation in Modern Narrative: Toward a 
Sociology of Representation." He says, in effect, that in order to 
explore the contradictions between textual performance and what 
might seem to be its determining factors (psyche, history, society, 
culture), we need a multileveled exploration of textual history, looking 
"not only on the level of what is represented (which would reduce this 
project to some genealogy of the signified) but also on the level of who 
or what is representing." The interdependence of these various levels 
as well as the disjunction between them is significant to a sociological 
study of representation. 23 
22. These quotations, widely taken as representative of H.D.'s conception of 
authorship, are from Helen in Egypt (New York, 1961), p. 22, and Hermetic Definition (New 
York, 1972), p. 7. 
23. See Robert Weimann, "Text, Author-Function, and Appropriation in Modern 
Narrative: Toward a Sociology of Representation," Critical Inquiry 14 (Spring 1988): 432. 
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If it makes sense to ask who or what is representing, under what 
conditions, with what set of concerns, and so on, it also makes sense to 
consider how the relation between author and reader differs under 
different social circumstances. Miller quotes Jonathan Culler on this 
issue: "'For a woman to read as a woman is not to repeat an identity or an 
experience that is given but to play a role she constructs with reference to her 
identity as a woman, which is also a construct, so that the series can continue: a 
woman reading as a woman reading as a woman'" ("CS," p. 1 08). 24 
Third-world women and lesbians have been especially articulate 
about the importance of reading the work of authors who belong to 
disenfranchised groups with which they identify. Biddy Martin and 
Chandra Talpade Mohanty, for instance, raise the issue of author-func-
tion in their article "Feminist Politics: What's Home Got to Do with 
It?"25 They acknowledge that their experience of reading Minnie Bruce 
Pratt, the subject of their essay, violates what they call "deconstructive" 
assumptions about reading and authorship. Pratt's text is conventional 
in that it collapses the distance between author and narrator, it conveys 
explicit author intentionality, and it claims personal and political 
authenticity. Having said this, however, Martin and Mohanty go on to 
say: 
Our reading of Pratt's narrative contends that a so-called conven-
tional narrative such as Pratt's is not only useful but essential in 
addressing the politically and theoretically urgent questions 
surrounding identity politics. Just as Pratt refuses the methodologi-
cal imperative to distinguish between herself as actual biographical 
referent and her narrator, we have at points allowed ourselves to 
let our reading of the text speak for us. 26 
A leftist politics, as opposed to a theory, of reading should involve the 
sense of a legitimate relationship between author and reader as it does, 
for instance, in essays by Alice Walker, Sherley Anne Williams, 
Adrienne Rich, and Judy Grahn. 27 This does not, of course, establish 
24. The reference is to Jonathan Culler, On Deconstruction: Theory and Criticism after 
Structuralism (Ithaca, N.Y., 1982), p. 64. 
25. See Biddy Martin and Chandra Talpade Mohanty, "Feminist Politics: What's 
Home Got to Do with It?" in Feminist Studies J Critical Studies, pp. 191-212. 
26. Ibid., p. 194. 
27. For examples of impassioned readings, see Alice Walker's In Search of Our Moth-
er's Gardens (San Diego, 1983), and her dedication and afterword to I Love Myself When I 
Am Laughing ... And Then Again When I Am Looking Mean and Impressive: A Zora Neale 
Hurston Reader (Old Westbury, N.Y., 1979); Sherley Anne Williams's foreword to 
Hurston's Their Eyes Were Watching God (Urbana, III., 1978); Adrienne Rich's essay about 
reading judy Grahn, "Power and Danger: Works of a Common Woman," On Lies, Secrets, 
and Silence: Selected Prose 1966-1978 (New York, 1979), pp. 247-58; and judy Grahn, The 
Highest Apple: Sappho and the Lesbian Poetic Tradition (San Francisco, 1985), esp. pp. xvi 
andxxi. 
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the author as precisely and uniformly the subjective presence her read-
ers take her to be any more than it establishes the text's meaning as 
only the one assigned to it by such readers. Though I may not wish to 
treat texts as the private property of their authors, I am unwilling to 
lose the sense of vital links between women that only a practice which 
preserves authors in some form can provide. 
My own brand of persona criticism assumes that to erase a woman 
poet as the author of her poems in favor of an abstract indeterminacy is 
an act of oppression. However, every version of the persona will be a 
mask of the author we cannot lightly remove. When one discovers the 
proliferation of a certain kind of mask in a given poet (the mask of the 
passionate virgin in Sara Teasdale, for instance), it is interesting to me 
to ask: What social configurations of the feminine might have led to this 
mask? Why did so many women readers of the 1920s delight in it? How 
representative is this mask and what contradicts it? How can I use my 
insights about the way masks function in women poets to illuminate 
previously obscure dimensions of women's history and women's rela-
tion to language, authorship, creativity, identity? 
We all know that many voices are speaking simultaneously in the 
poems we read. When I read I am, in a sense, rewriting the poem to suit 
my own political agenda, but that doesn't necessarily mean that I will 
construct the poem to duplicate my politics; I may be as likely to hear a 
patriarchal voice as a feminist one. Or I may feel the poem is interest-
ing precisely because it attempts to evade political analysis. 
Ideology will also govern our construction of the author, especially 
but not only if the author becomes un sujet a aimer, a someone to love. 
Yes, I want to ask like Foucault "What difference does it make who is 
speaking?" But I want to answer, the difference it makes, in terms of the 
voices I can persuade you are speaking, occupies a crucial position in 
the ongoing discussion of difference itself. 
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